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SI 1: Summary and descriptive statistics   
 
A Survey items  
 
Table A1: Description of the survey variables  




(White – c29) Do you share the demands of the 
protestors? 
(RES –v30) What is your attitude to these 
demands advanced at demonstrations taking place 
during the last Duma and presidential elections? 
Continuous:  
1: Fully Disagree;  
4: Fully Agree   
Dummy:  
1: Agrees  
0: Disagrees  
Unfair duma  (White – c4a) Thinking about the most recent 
parliamentary elections to the State Duma, please 
evaluate on a five-point scale how honestly and 
fairly they were conducted. 
(RES –v27) Speaking of the recent elections to the 
Duma, how fair do you think were these elections 
on a scale from 1 to 5? 
1: Fair  
5: Unfair  
Protest item (Protest Event Dataset) Counts the frequency of 
rallies taking place in a respondent’s region up to 
the day of their interview  
0: One regional protest 
event prior to a 
respondent’s interview -  
88 protests 
Protesters (Protest Event Dataset) We present this measure 
only for respondents interviewed in January 2012. 
It captures the average number of rally participants 
taking to streets in a region up to the day of a 
respondent’s interview  
0- 11 413 protesters   
Repression   (Protest Event Dataset) Police-led violence used 
during a political protest event taking place up to 
the day of any respondent’s interview  
1: Repression used 
0: No repression  
Watches News (White – f3.1) How often do you take an interest 
in political news on television? (RES v5) Do you 
ever watch daily political news programs (on 
television)? 
1: Watches news   
0: Does not watch news/ 
hardly ever does  
Employed  (White –g12) What is your primary occupation?  
(RES -139) Which answer best describes your 
employment status at present time? 
1: Employed  
0: Not Employed   
Education  (White –g3 & RES -v120) What is your 
education? 
1: Lower  
2: Secondary  
3: Higher  
Nationality  (White –g7) What is your nationality?  
(RES –v121) Who do you consider yourself to be 
by nationality?  
1: Russian 
0: Non-Russian  
Gender  Respondent’s sex  1: Male  
0: Female  
Age  Respondents’ age  18-92 
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Protested in the 
past   
(White – b25 e) In the past two years, have you 
taken part in a demonstration, picket, march or 
protest meeting?  
(RES v105) Have you ever in your life participated 
in any kind of street demonstration, regardless of 
whether this was about your local problems or 
problems of the country as a whole? 
1: Yes  




(White – a3) Economic Position of the Family – 
past 12 months 
(RES –v128) How has your family’s material 
situation changed over the past 12 months? 
1: Improved  
2: Same  
3: Deteriorated  
Duma Vote  (White – c13) Which party did you vote for in the 
elections of the State Duma on December 4 2011?  
(RES) 80. Did you cast a ballot in the election to 
the state duma, on December 4th, 2011? 81. Would 
you mind saying for which party or bloc you 
voted?  
1: Voted for UR 
 
0: Did not vote for UR   
Urban/ Rural   (White – y1_5 & RES - status) Settlement Status  1: Urban  
0: Rural  
 
 
Notes Regarding the Surveys 
The empirical analysis relies on the combination of items from two different, 
nationally representative public opinion surveys. The first survey was administered in 
January, and the second in April/May 2012. Where different coding schemes applied in the 
two questionnaires, the variables were recoded for consistency. Overall, however, the 
demographic variables we control for in the analysis are asked in a straightforward way. The 
question regarding electoral falsifications, is also repeated almost verbatim. We provide 
details of our coding scheme below.  
Share Demands  
The questions regarding awareness of, and attitudes towards, the demands of the 
protesters were less consistent across the two surveys, in that the RES informed respondents 
that “during the protests elections were called dishonest and unfair, and demands were made 
for new, early, honest elections,” yet similar enough to allow meaningful comparisons. Most 
importantly, both surveys allow respondents to state (i) whether they are aware of the 
unfolding events first, and (ii) whether they agree with the demands of the opposition next. In 
the White Survey, only respondents who know about the meetings and protests that took 
place in Moscow and other Russian cities are asked whether they know about or share their 
demands. If respondents admit to “knowing anything, or almost anything” refuse, or find it 
difficult to answer the question on whether they know about the protest events, numerators 
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are asked to proceed to the next set of questions. In other words, for the Stephen White 
survey, only respondents who know about the meetings and the general demands of the 
protesters are asked whether they agree with them. This is also the case for the Russian 
Election Study Respondents. We provide the exact question wordings below:  
From the survey led by Stephen White:  
c27: How much do you know about the meetings and protests that took place in 
Moscow and other Russian cities after the elections to the State Duma? 1: I know a lot – I 
follow the news attentively; 2: I know rather a lot; 3: I know a little, but not much; 4: I don’t 
know anything, or almost anything (Go to question С30); 5: (Hard to Say) (Go to question 
С30) 6: (Refused to Answer) (Go to question С30).
1
  
c28: Do you know anything about the general demands of the protestors? 1: I know a 
lot – I follow the news attentively; 2: I know rather a lot; 3: I know a little, but not much; 4: I 
don’t know anything, or almost anything (Go to question С30); 5: (Hard to Say) (Go to 
question С30); 6: (Refused to Answer) (Go to question С30)  
c29: Do you share the demands of the protestors? 1: I totally share their demands; 2: I 
somewhat share their demands; 3: I somewhat disagree with their demands; 4: I completely 
disagree with their demands; (We drop response categories 5 (Hard to Say) and 6: (Refused 
to Answer)). The analysis presented in Table 1 of the manuscript relies on this survey item. 
Only respondents who provide response categories 1-4 are included in the analysis.  
From the Russian Election Study (RES):  
V30. During the last State Duma and presidential elections, a fairly large number of 
street demonstrations took place during which these elections were called dishonest and 
unfair, and demands were made for new, early, honest elections. What is your attitude to 
these demands advanced at these demonstrations? 1: Fully agree; 2: tend to agree; 3: tend not 
to agree; 4: completely disagree; 5: Don’t know about these demonstrations; 6: Don’t know 
about these demands; 7: Hard to say; 8: Refused.  
The analysis presented in the manuscript relies on the combination from survey items 
c29 and v30. We drop respondents who do not know about the protesters and their demands. 
As such, our main dependent variable ranges on a scale from 1 to 4, with higher values 
denoting greater support for the protesters and their demands.  
                                                     
1
 The analysis presented in Section 3A of the SI relies on this item. Respondents who don’t 
know about the meetings and protests are assigned a value of 1. Respondents who offer 
response categories 1-3 are assigned a value of 0.  
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We also probe robustness, using an item that taps into respondents’ evaluations of electoral 
falsifications. Across the two surveys, this question is posed as follows:  
Unfair Duma – results presented in the Appendix:  
The falsifications question in the Stephen White Survey is posed as follows: “c4a. In 
some countries people are sure that elections are conducted honestly and fairly. In other 
countries people are sure that elections are not fairly conducted. Thinking about the most 
recent parliamentary elections to the State Duma, please evaluate on a five-point scale how 
honestly and fairly they were conducted. 1: Elections were conducted dishonestly and 
unfairly 5: Elections were conducted fairly and honestly 6: (Hard to Say) 7: Refused to 
Answer.” The same question appears as follows in the Russian Election Study survey: “q27: 
In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, 
people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. […] And, if we talk about elections 
to the State Duma this past December, how fair in your opinion were these elections?  1: Last 
Duma Elections Were Fair; 5: Last Duma Elections Were Unfair; 7: Hard to Say; 8: Refusal.”  
The two variables are recoded, and subsequently combined as follows:  
1: Elections Were Conducted Fairly,  
5: Elections were Conducted Unfairly,  




B Protests and Repression  
 
Protest events: Information on protest events is sourced from namarsh.ru. Electoral or 
political protests mainly include anti-government protests. Protests may include other issues, 
but criticism of regime/ government policy/ politics or demands for the protection of political 
rights form the crux of the event. These protests are often organized by the political 
opposition, though they are not exclusive to one particular party or civic movement; they 
include events like the March of the Millions, a mass civic march organized by the political 
opposition, and Strategiya-31 civic meetings organized in support of the right to peaceful 
assembly. Both movements were particularly active during the 2011-2012 protest movement. 
Anti-government protests organized by nationalist activists (excluding those sponsored by the 
government) are also coded as political protests; protests challenging electoral fraud, as well 
                                                     
2
 We replicate the analysis by placing Don’t Know/ Hard to tell in the middle of the 
distribution, that is, by placing them in the third category of the “unfairness” variable which 
ranges on a 5-point scale. The results of the statistical analysis remain consistent.  
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as protests against local and regional instances of electoral fraud; protests featuring calls for 
resignation of elected or appointed officials at all levels of government (regional and local 
politicians and other public officials); protests against political repression, such as rallies 
calling for the release of political prisoners; and protests organized by the group Memorial in 
support of political activists and against police abuse and repression of political activists. 
Because we create the dataset ourselves we are confident that the protest events considered 
only include anti-regime political protest events that are directly or indirectly related to 
electoral outcomes at the local and federal level, political abuses and the arrest of protest 
participants during this period. This is a distinct advantage of our data collection strategy. 
Protest events that take place on the same date but are organised in different regions, or even 
in different squares in the same region, and led by different groups are coded as separate 
entries.
3
 We are fully aware that the namarsh source does not contain data on each and every 
protest event considering the over- and under-reporting of activism in particular regions. 
Together with additional sources that we also employ, namely the IKD protest data, they 
provide a reasonably reliable picture of spatial and temporal trends in activism across Russia. 
Figure B1 below gives the distribution of the protest item as it appears in the paper. 
The top figures offer the distribution of the protest item before and after log transformation 
for respondents interviewed in January 2012. The lower part of the graph offers the 
distribution of the protest item before and after log transformation for respondents 
interviewed in both January 2012, and April/May 2012. Figure B2 gives the distribution of 
the protesters’ indicators used in the analysis. In the manuscript and appendix, we probe 
robustness using pre, and post-logarithmically transformed iterations of the protest frequency 
and size indicators. We also check robustness using models that consider respondents in areas 
with and without protest events. We finally run analysis restricting the sample to respondents 
in areas with protest events alone. 
                                                     
3
 Namarsh.ru reports one of the entries (protest in St. Petersburg and Tomsk) as taking place 
on both December 28
th
 and January 28
th
. While we have been able to find alternative 
resources reporting on the events in St Petersburg on December 28
th
, we have not found an 
additional report of the event in Tomsk. For this reason, we omit this event from all the 
analyses we run. Yet, results are not sensitive to this choice. In the protest-event dataset 
uploaded on Dataverse, we have marked this entry with an asterix.  
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Figure B2: Distribution of the protest size indicators used in Tables 1&2 of the 
manuscript (January survey only) 
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Repression: The repression indicator captures attempts by the public authorities, 
police or pro-government groups to disrupt a protest and carry out repressive activities, 
including arrests of protesting activists. Active disruption implies that we do not simply 
record a repression event when police are present at an event observing the participants. For 
repression to occur, protesters have to be disrupted either through forced dispersal, physical 
attacks or arrest. The dataset also includes a “pre-emptive repression” variable, which 
captures whether protest events are being thwarted by police before they take place. It is 
often the case for example that one or several activists gather in a square in anticipation of 
others to join, but the OMON, or police forces interfere before others join-in. One could 
plausibly assume that these protests were less likely to have been authorized. The correlation 
between this measure and the variable that captures active use of violence against protesters 
during the period covered in the data is positive, but small (r=.23, 0.01). In the early months 
of the protest movement, repression against protesters was used rarely. We estimate for 
example, that the percentage of violently repressed protest events dropped from 
approximately 30% in December 2011 to around 10% in January 2012.  Yet, the use of 
repression against activists taking to the streets grew in the spring months. In the spring 
months of 2012, approximately one in every three protests was subject to some form of 
violent repression by the police forces. The coverage of violent, or disruptive, protest events 
in state-controlled media, also increased over-time.  Drawing on evidence from the coverage 
of protests in state-controlled newspapers and TV stations during this period, Figures B3 
below shows precisely how the coverage of police-led arrests of protesters, and the use of 
violence in state-controlled media varied during this period.  
Figure B3 relies on the coverage of protest stories across the following state-
controlled newspapers Izvestiya (dataset identifier: 2573 and 74); Komsomolskaya Pravda 
(id: 464 and 10690); Rossiyskaya Gazeta (id: 145) and TV-channels: Pervyi Kanal (id: 1178 
and 21141), Rossiya 1 (code 9830) and NTV (id:8268 and 8264). Using the total sample of 
stories that contain the word protests, i.e. (протест*) published in these media outlets and 
downloaded from the online database Integrum, vertical bars count monthly references to 
“arrests” (арест*/ задерж*), while the dotted line counts monthly references to the 
“OMON,” (омон*) Russia’s special police forces. The corpus of downloaded stories on 
which Figure B3 relies has been made available on the Dataverse page for this article.
4
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Figure B3: Coverage of violent protests and arrests across state-controlled media. 
 
  
C Regional democracy indicators 
Indicators of regional democratic performance come from the Petrov and Titkov index of 
regional democracy in Russia. This index is based on expert ratings of the following: (1) 
Regional political organization: it evaluates the balance of powers between the executive and 
the legislative branches, independence of the courts and of law enforcement agencies, 
violations of citizens’ rights. (2) Openness of regional political life and the transparency of 
regional politics. (3) The democratic nature of elections at all levels: free and fair elections, 
electoral competition, manipulations and restrictions on active and passive electoral rights. 
(4) Political pluralism: the stability of the party system, representation of parties in the 
regional parliaments, presence of political coalitions. (5) Mass media independence from 
federal and regional control.  (6) Corruption: evaluating the link between economic and 
political elites, corruption scandals. (7) Economic liberalization: regional law and law 
enforcement, conflicts regarding property rights. (8) Civil society: freedom of NGOs, 
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referenda, public protest activity. (9) Elites: the composition and pluralism of elites and 
mechanisms of rotation of leaders, pluralism of elites. (10) Municipal autonomy: presence of 
elected municipal government institutions, their powers. A five- point scale was used to 
assess each region in each of the ten categories, with “the higher the number, the more 
democracy”. The average democracy rating is calculated by adding up individual ratings in 
each of the ten categories. The highest possible score is fifty.  (Data and discussion of the 
indices are available from: Sotsial’nyy atlas rossiyskikh regionov: Integral’nye indeksy: 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml#methods). In the analysis presented in the 
manuscript, we rely on the most recent scores of regional democratic performance. The 

















SI 2: Full model specifications and robustness checks 
 
A. Evidence from the first weeks of the protests: Robustness checks for Table 1 in the 
manuscript   
 
Table 2A1 probes robustness using alternative specifications of the protest item:  
 Model 1, uses the binary indicator of protests. Results are consistent.  
 Models 2 and 3 use two non-logarithmically transformed indicators of protest events 
and participants. Results are consistent.  
 Models 4 and 5 only consider respondents in places with protest events prior to their 
interview. Results are consistent.   
 
Table 2A2 probes robustness using alternative model specifications:
5
  
 Models 1 and 2 reports coefficients from ordered logistic models. Results are 
consistent.   
 Models 3 and 4 report coefficients from probit models. Results are consistent.   
 Models 5 and 6 report coefficients from OLS models that cluster standard errors by 
districts, while Models 7 and 8 cluster standard errors by settlements. Results are 
consistent. 
 
Table 2A3 shows that the results are robust when we drop Moscow and St Petersburg from 
the analysis. Models 1-3 report coefficients from OLS models that cluster standard errors by 
regions. Models 4-6 report coefficients from Ologit models that also cluster standard errors 
by regions.  
 Models 1 and 4 use the binary indicator of protests 
 Model 2 and 5 use the log indicator of protest events 










                                                     
5 When relying on evidence from the early weeks of the protest movement, we do not report 
results from regional fixed effects models. This is because the regional clusters in our sample 
have as little as 18 or 20 observations. In other words, when we draw on evidence from the 
January 2012 survey alone, we have a small number of observations which does not justify 
the use of regional fixed effects models. The coefficients on the protest-event variables, 
however, do not change if we run analysis with regional fixed effects. In OLS models with 
robust standard errors and regional fixed effects, we see that a 10 percent increase in protests 
will increase support for the protesters by approximately .5.  This change is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. The binary protest coefficient in similar models is 1.25, and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In analyses that rely on the combination of the 





Table 2A1: Alternative specifications of the protest item  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Protest dummy  0.36***     
 (0.08)     
Events (non-log)  0.03***    
  (0.01)    
Participants (no-log)    0.00***   
   (0.00)   
Log events (1-max)     0.11***  
    (0.03)  
Log participants (1-max)     0.10*** 
     (0.03) 
      
Watches TV 0.05 0.17 0.21 -0.28** -0.20* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) 
Protested past  0.50*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Education 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Male 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11* 0.11 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Urban 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
UR voter  -0.78*** -0.80*** -0.79*** -0.80*** -0.80*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Pocketbook worse 0.06 0.08* 0.08* 0.09* 0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Employed  -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Media_indepv2 -0.08* -0.06 -0.04 -0.09** -0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 2.62*** 2.61*** 2.51*** 3.19*** 2.63*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.35) 
Observations 850 850 850 666 666 
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 2012 January 






Table 2A2: Alternative model specifications  
 
 Ologit models Probit models OLS, SE 
clustered by 
districts 
OLS, SE clustered by 
settlements  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Events (log)   0.45***  0.35***  0.20***  0.20***  
 (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
People (log)  0.15***  0.10***  0.06***  0.06*** 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Watches TV 0.21 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) 
Protested  1.32*** 1.23*** 0.82** 0.69* 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.37) (0.38) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Education 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Male 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Urban -0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
UR voter -1.7*** -1.7*** -0.9*** -0.9*** -0.8*** -0.8*** -0.80*** -0.79*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Pocketbook 0.18* 0.19* 0.12 0.13* 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Employed -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Media -0.25** -0.3*** -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.11* -0.08 -0.11 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant -1.8*** -1.7*** 0.04 0.09 2.64*** 2.63*** 2.64*** 850 
 (0.67) (0.65) (0.48) (0.48) (0.37) (0.36) (0.39) (0.38) 
Observations 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 2012 January 




Table 2A3: We probe robustness while excluding Moscow and St Petersburg from the 
analysis. 
 
 OLS models  OLogit models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Protest dummy  0.32***   0.75***   
 (0.08)   (0.20)   
Log events  0.22***   0.54***  
  (0.05)   (0.13)  
Log protesters    0.06***   0.13*** 
   (0.01)   (0.03) 
       
Watches news 0.45* 0.42* 0.46** 0.93* 0.86 0.98** 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.52) (0.56) (0.50) 
Protested before 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.48*** 1.31*** 1.38*** 1.26*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) 
Education 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Male 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.33** 0.34** 0.33** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.10 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
UR voter -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.83*** -1.73*** -1.73*** -1.75*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Pocketbook worse 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Employed -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Media -0.08* -0.06 -0.10** -0.24** -0.20* -0.29*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Urban -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Constant 2.24*** 2.18*** 2.23*** -0.90 -0.82 -0.90 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.77) (0.79) (0.75) 
       
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 
 
Robust standard errors, clustered by regions in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 








B. Evidence from the first weeks of the protests: IV estimation and robustness  
 
1. Extended discussion  
Using evidence from the first few weeks of the protest wave alone, we instrument the 
frequency and size of protest events by exploiting variation in weather conditions across 
regional capitals (see also: Collins and Margo 2007; Madestam et al. 2013; Sobolev 2013). 
As an instrument, we use the deviation of the average regional temperature during the first 
weeks of the protest wave from the long-term average temperature for the months of 
December and January. The instrument, just like the protest measure we employ, varies 
across regions and over time, i.e. it is sensitive to the timing of survey respondents’ 
interview. To construct it, we ask how much colder, or warmer the weather from the 
December 4
th
 2011 election and up to the day of a respondent’s interview in January 2012 
was from the long-term average temperature in a region for this period.
6
 This measure varies 
across regions and takes into account information for days that had and did not have any 
rallies.  
Taking variation in the timing of respondents’ interview is important, as respondents 
in the same region were often interviewed weeks apart - in Tomsk for example, while some 
survey respondents were interviewed on January 9
th
 others were interviewed on January 22
rd
. 
The instrument we use assumes that the number of protests and protesters is influenced by 
two factors: (i) (the deviation of) the temperature on the days with protests from the long-
term average, and also (ii) the deviation of the temperature from the long-term average on 
days without protests. For example, if there is only one protest taking place in Tomsk in 
December 2011 and January 2012, this could well be because of two types of temperature 
deviations: one on the day that the protest did happen, and the other one on days without 
protests, during which the weather could have been much colder than average.  
Moreover, we think of the number and size of protests as an outcome that is 
determined by protest organizers on the one hand, and protest participants on the other. We 
assume that when the weather forecast predicts colder than average temperature for a region, 
protest organizers will be less likely to stage protests. If protests have been scheduled to take 
                                                     
6 For some month/regions we were unable to find relevant information through either the 
Russian meteorological service or Gismeteo, even when we tried to use weather stations in 
airports – and not in the capital. We therefore treat the following month/regions as missing 
observations: Voronezh: January-December: 1995-7, December 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2002; 
Krasnodar: December 1997; Rostov: December 1997. Stavropol: December 1995-January 
1998; Samara and Leningrad oblast: January 1995-December 2007; Irkutsk: January 1995-
2002.  
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place weeks in advance, unusually cold weather may also prevent multiple, usually smaller, 
rallies and spontaneous protests staged in support of the big protest in the regional capital, 
from taking place. As such, colder than average weather could reduce the number of protests 
that would take place in a region on any given day. We also assume that colder than average 
weather affects rally attendance, as it makes participation less pleasant, and that ‘weather 
shocks’ influences affect attitudes toward the protest movement only through the frequency 
of protests and size of protesters.  This hypothesis is in line with existing research 
documenting that rainfall or cold weather more broadly, reduce rally attendance (see Collins 
and Margo 2007; Madestam et al. 2013; Sobolev 2013). 
As discussed in the manuscript, we think of the frequency and size of protests as an 
outcome that is determined by political leaders, or protest organizers on the one hand, and 
protest participants on the other. We assume that when the weather forecast predicts cold 
weather, or when protest organisers wake up and the temperature is very low, they will be 
less likely to stage any protests. In case protests have been scheduled to take place weeks in 
advance, cold weather could prevent multiple, usually smaller, rallies and spontaneous 
protests staged in support of the “big” protest in the regional capital, from taking place. 
Consider the following example: on December 24
th
, 2011, the day Gorbachev called on Putin 
to resign, several protest events took place across the country. On that day, our evidence 
suggests that 3 protest events took place in Samara, and 2 in Nizhny Novgorod. Our 
hypothesis predicts that cold weather could influence not only whether protests would take 
place, but also how many regional protests will occur. We also assume that cold weather 
affects rally attendance. This expectation is straightforward, and it has been repeatedly 
documented that colder weather – as well as rainfall for example - could reduce participation 
in rallies. Focusing on the 2011-2012 electoral protests in Russia, Anton Sobolev also 
documents a positive correlation between the average regional temperature in January and 
participation in protests (Sobolev 2013).  
As with every instrumental design, we need to make some assumptions: First, we 
assume that temperature shocks are random, that is, not necessarily correlated with other 
factors that affect political outcomes. Yet, one potential concern is that colder places also 
tend to share certain political characteristics. This would arguably be a greater concern if we 
relied on average monthly temperature across regions, or if we used a measure of average 
temperature on days of rallies, as opposed to an indicator of “temperature shocks.” In other 
words, using a measure of “temperature shocks” could facilitate identification. Yet to address 
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such concerns, the IV regressions presented in the manuscript also control for regional 
democracy, using a media independence variable as a proxy.  
Second, we assume that cold weather affects awareness and support for the protest 
movement only through the number of protest events and protesters that take to the streets. 
This exclusion restriction is well established in the literature, yet several concerns remain 
unresolved. Madestam et al. acknowledge two ways in which this assumption could be 
violated (Madestam et al. 2013). First, bad weather could make a rally less pleasant for actual 
attendees, which would subsequently energize them less. As we are concerned with protest 
effects on bystanders, and control for prior protest attendance in the analysis, this is perhaps a 
smaller concern for our work. Here, we assume that bystanders infer the power of the 
movement by mainly looking at the number and average size of events that take place in their 
region; such “exposure” could be either direct, as when people see the events themselves, or 
mediated as when bystanders learn about the events through word of mouth or social media. 
Second, Madestam et al. (2013) suggest that weather could directly affect the likelihood that 
mass media cover the protests. Although previous research has established a robust 
correlation between the frequency of protests in Russia and their coverage in national, state 
controlled media, we are not in a position to document how the coverage of protest in 
regional media varied over time (Lankina, Watanabe, and Netesova 2016), p. 20). This is a 
limitation we acknowledge in the concluding section of the manuscript, and a fruitful avenue 
for future research. Yet, even with these two caveats in mind, and in line with prior research, 

























B2. Full model specifications and robustness.  
 
- Table 2B1 provides full results for the second stage IV regressions presented in 
Models 1 and 2, Table 2 in the manuscript   
 
- Table 2B2 provides full results for the first stage IV regressions presented in Models 
1 and 2, Table 2 in the manuscript   
 
- Table 2B3 replicates the analysis in Models 1 and 2, Table 2 of the manuscript using 
a binary outcome variable and employing two-stage probit models with endogenous 
regressors. Here, we assign respondents who ‘fully, or partly’ share the demands of 
the opposition a value of 1 and those who ‘partly, or fully disagree’ with them a value 
of 0. The results remain consistent. 
 
- Table 2B4 uses an instrument that does not consider variation in respondents’ 
interview dates and two continuous indicators of protest events. This iteration of the 
instrument used here compares how much colder, or warmer the average regional 
temperature in December 2011 and January 2012 was from the long-term temperature 


































Table 2B1: Second stage IV regressions.   
 (1) (2) 
Protest item (log)  0.319** 0.113** 
 (0.133) (0.047) 
Watches news 0.146 0.134 
 (0.167) (0.150) 
Protested before  0.502*** 0.424*** 
 (0.126) (0.134) 
Education 0.008 0.009 
 (0.047) (0.048) 
Male 0.072 0.070 
 (0.060) (0.060) 
Age 0.004 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Russian 0.047 0.021 
 (0.093) (0.094) 
Urban -0.071 -0.028 
 (0.075) (0.071) 
Voted UR  -0.808*** -0.804*** 
 (0.074) (0.074) 
Pocketbook worse 0.090* 0.096** 
 (0.046) (0.047) 
Employed  -0.033 -0.024 
 (0.070) (0.071) 
Media independence  -0.139** -0.207** 
 (0.071) (0.096) 
Constant 2.679*** 2.673*** 
 (0.280) (0.274) 
   
 First stage: Instrumenting protests 
Temperature deviations  0.122*** 0.346*** 
 (0.014) (0.032) 
Controls Yes  Yes 
 Model statistics 
Observations 850 850 
F-test of excluded instruments  71.4 115.6 
Cragg-Donald F statistic   66.20 46.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Protest-Event 













Table 2B2: First stage IV regression coefficients for Table 1 in the manuscript 
 (1) (2) 
 DV: Protest events 
(log) 
DV: Protesters  
(log) 
Temperature shocks  0.122*** 0.346*** 
 (0.014) (0.032) 
Controls    
UR voter 0.046 0.094 
 (0.061) (0.212) 
Protested past  0.122 1.039*** 
 (0.136) (0.398) 
Education 0.063 0.171 
 (0.043) (0.148) 
Male 0.016 0.060 
 (0.053) (0.182) 
Age -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
Russian  -0.083 0.003 
 (0.120) (0.396) 
Urban 0.216*** 0.229 
 (0.056) (0.216) 
Watches news -0.170 -0.376 
 (0.203) (0.608) 
Pocketbook: worse  -0.109*** -0.362*** 
 (0.035) (0.125) 
Employed  -0.106* -0.386* 
 (0.064) (0.210) 
Local media  0.527*** 2.094*** 
 (0.036) (0.123) 
Constant -1.068*** -2.965*** 
 (0.301) (0.993) 
Observations 850 850 
R-squared 0.265 0.297 
Notes: First stage IV Regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** 















Table 2B3: Results from first and second stage probit models with continuous 
endogenous regressors  
 
 Model 1: Log 
protest events 
Model 2: Log 
average protesters 
Model 3: Protest  
events  






















 stage  
         
Protest item  0.72***  0.24***  0.12***  0.00***  
 (0.19)  (0.06)  (0.03)  0.00***  
Temp dev  0.12***  0.35***  0.79***  509.26*** 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (46.88) 
         
Media  -0.22** 0.53*** -0.36*** 2.09*** -0.13 2.65*** -0.06 1,342.40*** 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.07) (102.61) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
         
Constant 0.16 -1.07*** 0.20 -2.97*** 0.03 -6.00*** -0.37 -1,485.28 
 (0.46) (0.30) (0.44) (0.99) (0.47) (1.78) (0.47) (1,164.49) 
F (12, 837)
7
  25.20  29.44  25.61  22.07 
Observations 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 
 
 
Table 2B4: Robustness: Alternative instrument specifications: IV-probit models. The 
instrument we use here does not consider variation in respondents’ interview dates.  
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
 Shares demands 
2
nd













Protest events item   0.07***  0.49***  
 (0.03)  (0.18)  
Average temp deviation  1.32***  0.19*** 
  (0.10)  (0.02) 
Media independence  -0.04 2.55*** -0.12 0.51*** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.10) (0.04) 
     
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant -0.03 -2.77* 0.07 -0.54* 
 (0.48) (1.61) (0.48) (0.29) 
F (12, 835)   29.35  34.71 
Observations 850 850 850 850 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models control for 
respondents’ prior protest participation, education, gender, age, ethnicity, settlement status, 
                                                     
7
 F-statistics obtained with the two-step option in ivprobit  
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news watching, partisanship, pocketbook assessments and employment status.  Source: 
Protest-Event Dataset and 2012 January survey 
 
 
C. Regional Protests and Regime Strategies: Evidence from the Protest Wave 
 
Robustness for Table 3 in the manuscript 
 
Table 2C1 presents the following robustness checks:  
Alternative specifications of the protest item:  
- Model 1.1 uses a logarithmically transformed indicator of protests. Yet, this item only 
considers respondents in areas with protests. In other words, we restrict the analysis to 
the “treated” group of respondents. We drop Moscow and St Petersburg in Model 1.2 
 
Alternative specifications of the outcome variable:  
- Models 2.1 and 2.2 treat the outcome variable as ordered, and presents results based 
on ordered logistic regressions. We drop Moscow and St Petersburg in Model 2.2 
- Model 3.1 and 3.2 recode the outcome variable into a dummy and presents probit 
coefficients. We drop Moscow & St Petersburg in Model 3.2  
 
Table 2C2 presents the following alternative model specifications:  
- Models 1-2 replicates the analysis in Table 3 of the manuscript, but cluster standard 
errors by regions.  
- Model 3 uses the log protest indicator and runs analysis without the survey, or region 
fixed effects.  
- Model 4 uses the binary protest indicator and runs analysis without the survey, or 
region fixed effects 
- Model 5 and 6 replicates the analysis in Models 1.1 and 1.2, Table 3 of the 
manuscript but controls for a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if respondents 
live in Moscow and St Petersburg, and zero otherwise 
- Model 7 runs analysis restricting the sample to respondents in Moscow and St 
Petersburg 
- Model 8 runs analysis restricting the sample to respondents in Moscow and St 






















Table 2C1: Robustness checks for Table 3 in the manuscript  
 
 OLS  Ologit Probit  
 (1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2) 
Protest log (1-max) -0.02 0.04     
 (0.08) (0.08)     
Protest log (0-max)   -0.24 -0.06 -0.22 -0.04 
   (0.20) (0.22) (0.14) (0.16) 
Protested past 0.29*** 0.18** 0.75*** 0.56*** 0.45*** 0.32** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12) (0.14) 
Education 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Male 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) 
Urban 0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) 
Watches News -0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.23 0.05 0.19 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.19) (0.21) (0.15) (0.17) 
UR voter -0.68*** -0.64*** -1.45*** -1.40*** -1.03*** -1.00*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
Pocketbook 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.12** 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Employed  0.04 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) 
Survey FE  -0.67*** -0.69*** -1.17*** -1.23*** -0.82*** -0.85*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.24) (0.25) (0.16) (0.16) 
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Moscow/ SP  ✓ -  ✓ -  ✓ -  
Constant 2.94*** 2.31*** -3.31*** -2.59*** 1.53*** 0.64 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.70) (0.48) (0.53) (0.42) 
       
Observations 1,648 1,379 1,980 1,711 1,980 1,711 
















Table 2C2. Robustness checks for Table 3 in the manuscript.   
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
           
Log events -0.15  -0.06  -0.05**  -0.11***  -0.57*** -0.14 
 (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.07) (0.16) 
Protest (0-1)  0.10  0.05  -0.02  -0.03   
  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.06)   
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -  - - - - - 
Survey FE -0.46* -0.60*** -0.48* -0.53*** - - - - - - 
 (0.23) (0.12) (0.24) (0.15)       
Media      0.07*** 0.05** 0.06** 0.04 -0.41*** - 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13)  
M/SP (0-1)     - - 0.30*** 0.07 - -0.55** 
       (0.08) (0.07)  (0.24) 
Constant 3.32*** 2.76*** 3.17*** 3.11*** 2.34*** 2.35*** 2.43*** 2.38*** 6.97*** 4.15*** 
 (0.67) (0.27) (0.22) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.71) (0.62) 
           
Observations 1,980 1,980 1,711 1,711 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 269 269 
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.36 0.35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: 2012 January survey, 2012 RES and author protest-event dataset.  
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D. News watching and support for the protesters 
 
Robustness and extended discussion for Table 4 in the manuscript 
 
Table 2D1. Full results for Table 4 in the manuscript 
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) 








 Full sample Without Moscow & St 
Petersburg 
Protest item  0.041 0.573* 0.105 0.412 
 (0.111) (0.302) (0.148) (0.305) 
News watching  0.377** 0.410* 0.365* 0.428* 
 (0.165) (0.249) (0.202) (0.247) 
Protest X News interaction  -0.207*** -0.501* -0.183 -0.389 
 (0.076) (0.264) (0.126) (0.265) 
     
Protested before  0.328*** 0.322*** 0.240*** 0.235*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.085) (0.085) 
Education 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.018 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
Male 0.013 0.008 0.031 0.029 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Russian 0.042 0.049 0.045 0.052 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.079) (0.079) 
Urban 0.011 0.005 0.015 0.013 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
Voted UR  -0.692*** -0.691*** -0.667*** -0.667*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) 
Pocketbook worse 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Employed  0.043 0.048 0.024 0.026 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) 
Survey fixed effects -0.449*** -0.600*** -0.473*** -0.529*** 
 (0.100) (0.057) (0.103) (0.069) 
Region fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 2.997*** 2.383*** 2.643*** 2.467*** 
 (0.335) (0.332) (0.267) (0.338) 
     
Observations 1,980 1,980 1,711 1,711 
R-squared 0.282 0.280 0.275 0.275 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: 2012 January survey, 2012 RES and author protest-event dataset.
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Table 2D.1A: Protest effects conditional on news watching  
 





Watches news Does not watch 
news 
Log protest item: 0  2.73 2.35 2.55 2.18 
Log protest item: mean 2.49 2.41 2.46 2.31 
Δ.  -.24 (-.43,.-.04) .06 (-.20, .31) -.10 (-27, -.09) .12 (-.16, .41) 
     
     
Log protest item:  
Mean + 1 SD 
2.32 2.45 2.40 2.18 
Δ.  -.40 (-.75, -.06) .10 (-.34, .55) -.15 (-.44, -.15) .20 (-.26, .66) 
Notes: Results are based on the interaction terms in Models 1.1., and 2.1, Table 2C1. 90 





Table 2D2 presents the following robustness checks:  
Alternative specifications of the protest item:  
- Model 1 replicates the analysis using a non-log transformed protest indicator  
- Model 2 uses a logarithmically transformed indicator of protests. This item only 
considers respondents in areas with protests. In other words, we restrict the analysis to 
the “treated” group of respondents. Moscow and St Petersburg are omitted in Model 2  
- Models 3 and 4 replicate the analysis in the manuscript, but clusters standard errors 
by regions  
 
Table 2D3 presents the following robustness checks:  
Alternative specifications of the outcome variable:  
- Models 1 and 2 treats the outcome variable as ordered, and presents results based on 
ordered logistic regressions. We drop Moscow and St Petersburg in Model 1.2 
- Models 3 and 4 recodes the outcome variable into a dummy and presents results 
based on probit regressions. We drop Moscow & St Petersburg in Model 2.2  
 
Alternative model specifications:  
- Models 5 and 6 run analysis without the survey, or region fixed effects.  
- Model 7 replicates the analysis in Models 1.1 and 1.2, Table 4 in the manuscript and 
controls for a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if respondents live in Moscow 
and St Petersburg, and zero otherwise 




Table 2D2: Robustness checks for Table 4 in the manuscript  
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2) 





         
Protest item  0.00 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.57 0.11 0.41 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.10) (0.13) (0.22) (0.44) (0.28) (0.44) 
Watches news  0.16 0.28* 0.20 0.06 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.43 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.23) (0.39) (0.30) (0.38) 
News X Protest  -0.01** -0.04 -0.15* -0.02 -0.21** -0.50 -0.18 -0.39 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.40) (0.17) (0.39) 
Region fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Survey fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Moscow /St Peter ✓ - ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - 
Constant 2.99*** 2.67*** 2.67*** 2.80*** 3.00*** 2.38*** 2.64*** 2.47*** 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.30) (0.24) (0.71) (0.44) (0.39) (0.42) 
         
Observations 1,980 1,711 1,648 1,379 1,980 1,980 1,711 1,711 




Table 2D3: Robustness checks for Table 4 in the manuscript  
 
 Ologit models  Probit models  OLS models  

















                
Protest item  0.18 1.18 0.30 0.87 0.02 0.85 0.21 0.63 0.08** 0.27** 0.06 0.19* 0.13* 0.56*** -0.27 
 (0.51) (1.00) (0.65) (1.00) (0.34) (0.69) (0.39) (0.67) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.21) (0.21) 
News  0.77 0.82 0.73 0.84 0.47* 0.60 0.50 0.62 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.54*** 0.59*** 0.78 
 (0.50) (0.88) (0.66) (0.87) (0.26) (0.40) (0.32) (0.39) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.20) (0.74) 
Interaction  -0.45** -1.04 -0.40 -0.81 -0.26*** -0.76* -0.28 -0.64 -0.12*** -0.32*** -0.11* -0.24** -0.26*** -0.62*** -0.32 
 (0.19) (0.91) (0.37) (0.90) (0.10) (0.42) (0.19) (0.41) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.22) (0.22) 
                
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Survey FE  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Media          0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06** 0.04 -0.42*** 
         (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) 
M/SPcontol             0.30*** 0.06  
             (0.08) (0.07)  
M/SP  ✓ ✓ -  - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant -2.59* -1.57 -2.15** -1.85** 1.13 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.26** 0.23* 0.28** 0.23* 2.01*** 1.91*** 6.03*** 
 (1.53) (0.97) (0.84) (0.94) (1.14) (0.69) (0.58) (0.66) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.25) (0.90) 
                







News watching: Extended discussion   
 
In our paper, we assume that the presentation of information about the protests in 
national media could moderate the effects of protests on public opinion. More specifically, 
we expect that the largely hostile framing of the protest movement in national media may 
influence the effect of protest on public opinion and attitudes. Our models therefore include 
interactions between the protest item and news consumption. The “news watching” variable 
we rely on asks whether and how often people watch political news on TV.  
Yet, according to one view, people with pre-formed opinions about electoral fairness 
and/ or support for the demands of the protesters could “self-select” in terms of whether, or 
how often they will be watching political news across a range of TV outlets. Opposition 
supporters, for example, may be less likely to watch political news on TV, as they know that 
information projected in national media is highly likely to be unreliable and/ or falsified. If 
this is the case, it could be that the “news watching,” or exposure to the state’s framing of the 
protest events via national media has no effect—whether direct or conditional—on opinions 
about electoral falsifications and/ or support for the demands of the opposition. The argument 
goes that people who watch political news on TV, or who watch political news more often, 
should also be more likely to disagree with the demands of the opposition and to report lower 
levels of fraud, as they already have pre-formed opinions about fraud and the opposition.  
In the Russian context, there are good reasons to believe that exposure to the state’s 
rhetoric about the protest movement via the mass media conditions the effect of protests on 
public opinion. Existing research on media effects under electoral authoritarianism shows 
that even opposition supporters, or citizens who are particularly wary of the state’s attempt to 
manipulate information in national media, often watching political news on TV, likewise 
regard state media as trustworthy. According to Smyth and Oates, state–run television 
remains one of the most trusted and authoritative institutions in Russia (Smyth and Oates 
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2015). It is also worth noting that in Russia, most households are equipped with a TV antenna 
that enables free access to a number of federal and regional channels. The leading state-
controlled TV channels have maximum regional and audience penetration, for instance, with 
100 percent for Russia 1 and Channel 1 and 99.9 percent for NTV. Moreover, most citizens 
in Russia derive news information from the leading 4 national channels (Russia 1, NTV, 
Channel 1 and Russia 24).  Last but not least, television remains an important source of 
information for a large proportion of Russia’s population. The respected Levada polling 
agency has consistently found high levels of TV viewing among the population, even in 
recent years as the state consolidated control over the media landscape.  For instance, a 
Levada poll conducted in December 2016 revealed that 91% of the population watch news on 
TV “at least once a week or more often.” This is consistent with the data we obtain from the 
analysis of our sample – where just 8 percent of respondents report to hardly ever watch 
political news. 6 percent of them never watch political news on TV. Another interesting 
aspect of viewership revealed by Levada’s media analysis is that many viewers report to 
watch news on state-controlled channels because of their “entertainment” value—in what 
would further support the argument that individuals with varied political preferences watch 
news on state-controlled television. Empirically we perform several tests to probe the 
robustness of the results.  
 First, we examine whether news watching predicts political attitudes. We do 
not find support for the hypothesis that respondents who watch news have 
more pro-conservative, or pro-regime attitudes.   
 
 Second, we used Coarsened Exact Matching to reduce imbalance between 
respondents who watch and do not watch news, and replicate the analysis 
presented in Table 2 of the manuscript. The results remain consistent.        
 
 Finally, we generate additional visualizations of the interaction models.  




News watching and political attitudes.  
To begin with, Table 2C4 uses the news watching variable employed in the 
manuscript to assess whether individuals who differ in their patterns of media consumption 
also differ in their political dispositions. Looking at the results, we see that when it comes to 
prior political attitudes and prior activism, the two groups are barely distinguishable. A key 
set of differences across all three groups that could pose concern relates to reported vote, and 
Medvedev’s approval. Respondents who watch political news on TV appear more likely to 
vote for parties other than United Russia, and/or to abstain, as they are less likely to 
disapprove of Medvedev. 
 
Table 2D4: Watches News vs Does Not: Means differences  
 





Voted for United Russia   .28 .34 .08 
Disapproves of Medvedev (both surveys)  .27 .23 .04 
Shares the demands of protesters   2.45 2.49 .04 
The 2011 Duma elections were unfair  3.01 3.02 .01 
Has previously participated in protests  .06 .05 .01 
Unconstrained leader not a good fit for Russia  .50 .52 .02 
 
Yet, one could argue that people watch TV and then decide whether to vote for the 
party of power, or to update their views on the performance of political leaders. Moreover, 
evidence from the two surveys we use in this paper, as well as evidence from the Levada 
Centre indicates that both Medvedev’s and Putin’s approval fluctuated significantly during 
the course of the 2011-2012 protest wave. While around 66 per cent of respondents approved 
of Medvedev in the January survey for example, this percentage was down to ~78 percent by 
the spring months when the Russian Election Survey was in the field. Measures of approval, 
therefore, are less likely to proxy for long-term partisanship or attitudes and personality traits. 
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Nevertheless, as we show in Table 2C5 below, these differences fail to reach statistical levels 
of significance when we use simple probit regressions to evaluate differences in support for 
UR and President Medvedev.  
Table 2D5: Differences in support for United Russia and Medvedev 
 DV: Voted for United 
Russia 
DV: Disapproves of Medvedev’s 
performance 
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
News watching  0.12 0.13 -0.12 -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Protested past  -0.00 0.05 0.35*** 0.34*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Education 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Male  -0.31*** -0.28*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Age 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian  -0.24*** -0.28*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
Urban  -0.40*** -0.39*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Pocketbook deteriorated -0.30*** -0.29*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employed  -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Media independence  -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.06* 0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Moscow/St Petersburg Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant 0.54*** 0.49** -1.78*** -2.04*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) 
     
Observations 3,047 2,712 2,902 2,584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, we use nearest neighbour matching to estimate the average treatment effect of 
news watching on 1) awareness of fraud and 2) support for the demands of the protesters, and 
also report balance. In three different models, respondents are matched using the 
Mahalanobis distance defined by (i) demographics and (ii) demographics, household 
assessments, protest participation, and support for the ruling regime party and candidate. 
Because existing research shows that NNM estimators are not consistent when we match on 
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two or more continuous covariates, we also use the bias-adjust estimator. In all models 
reported below, respectively, news watching fails to reach statistical levels of significance. 
This suggests that when it comes to awareness of fraud and/or support for the protesters, 
respondents who watch news, and those who hardly ever watch news, are statistically 
indistinguishable.  
Moreover, to test whether the “news watching” variable is a proxy for having pre-
conceived ideas about the regime and the opposition, we rely on a variable that taps into 
people’s authoritarian attitudes instead, as they bring us a step closer to operationalizing 
long-term political attitudes and attachments. If the news watching variable is a proxy for less 
pro-democratic attitudes, then it should also predict other political positions that are 
associated with having pre-conceived views about the regime. For example, individuals who 
are less likely to watch political news on TV should equally be more likely to hold more 
liberal views. We therefore follow Reuter and Szakonyi (2015) and check whether the 
frequency of political news watching predicts support for liberal views and find that it does 
not. The dependent variable we use below is a dummy coded as 0 if respondents feel that a 
strong, unconstrained, leader would be a good fit for the country and 1 if they disagree. This 
is a classic question traditionally used in the literature to ascertain citizens’ authoritarian 
versus democratic leaning preferences. The results presented below rely on NN matching, 
using the Mahalanobis distance and the bias-adjust estimator. The expectation that 
individuals who watch political news on TV, or those who more often do so, should have 









Table 2D6: News watching treatment effects: Unfair Duma Election  
ATE (Coef & SE)   -.10 (.13)  10 (.11) 
 Control (0) Treated (1)   Control (0)   Treated (1)   
Covariate Balance 
(Means) 
    
Education (continuous)  1.99 1.98 1.99 1.98 
Male  .39 .44 .39 .43 
Age  41.16 46.10 40.07 46.00 
Russian  .91 .91 .91 .90 
Urban settlement  .79 .75 .78 .75 
Employed  .61 .61 .63 .62 
Household finances    1.96 1.93 
Protested in the past    .07 .05 
Voted for United Russia   .30 .35 
Disapproves of 
Medvedev  
  .26 .22 
Raw observations  184 3,145 162 2,734 
 
Table 2D7: News watching treatment effect: Shares the demands of the protesters  
ATE (Coef & SE)  .11 (.14) .18 (.13) 
 
Covariate Balance:   
Control (0)   Treated (1)   Control (0)   Treated (1)   
Education  2.13 2.03 2.10 2.04 
Gender  .45 .45 .44 .45 
Age 39.26 46. 40 39.18 46.16 
Ethnicity  .93 .90 .94 .90 
Urban settlement  .80 .74 .81 .74 
Employed  .64 .62 .67 .63 
Household finances    1.95 1.92 
Protested before    .10 .06 
Voted for UR   .35 .36 
Disapproves of Medvedev    .31 .23 







Table 2D8: “News watching” does not predict political attitudes. The dependent variable 
captures whether respondents disagree with the statement that “a strong, unconstrained leader 
would be a good fit for Russia. 
 
Treatment .06 (.05) .05(.05) 
Covariate Balance:   Control (0)  Treated (1)   Control (0)  Treated (1)   
Education  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Gender  .42 .45 .42 .45 
Age 39.90 45.98 39.15 45.75 
Ethnicity  .92 .90 .92 .91 
Urban settlement  .78 .75 .78 .75 
Employed  .62 .62 .64 .62 
Household finances    1.97 1.94 
Protested before    .07 .05 
Voted for UR   .28 .35 
Disapproves of Medvedev    .28 .23 
Observations  153 2598 137 2,419 
 
Coarsened Exact Matching Results  
 In this section, we perform Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to improve the 
estimation of the effect of news watching on attitudes. Matching reduces imbalance in 
covariates between respondents who watch and do not watch political news on television. For 
the analysis, we use automated coarsening with STATA 12 and implement the CEM 
algorithm described in Iacus et al. (2012). The matching variable, news watching is a binary 
indicator assigned a value of 1 for respondents who watch news on TV, and zero for those 
who do not.  
We begin by matching respondents on the full set of covariates reported in the 
manuscript. First, we match respondents on demographics alone: education, gender, age, 
ethnicity, urban settlement, and employment status. Next, we also match respondents on 
household conditions and prior protest participation. Finally, we perform matching on 
demographics, prior protest participation and household finances, as well as prior vote, and 
assessments of Medvedev. The pre-matching L1 statistic for the three samples – a measure of 
imbalance with respect to the full joint distribution is as follows: .55, .76 and .89 
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respectively. The post-matching L1 statistic for the same three samples – a measure of 
imbalance improvement after matching is: .18, .04 and .26 respectively. By comparing the 
imbalance results, we can see that the matching algorithm has achieved a substantial 
reduction in imbalance in the marginal and joint distributions of the data. As some imbalance 
remains in the data, we also adjust for remaining imbalance via the statistical models we 
present below. While the sample size from Models 1 to 2 and 3 drops as we match on a larger 
number of covariates, the coefficient on the interaction term in both tables 2D.9 and 2D.10 
(which use a logarithmically transformed indicator of protest events, and a binary indicator of 
protests respectively) remains remarkably stable: just like in the manuscript, it is negatively 
signed and statistically significant.  
  
Table 2D9: CEM results: News watching and political attitudes  
 (1.1) (1.2) (2) (3) 
 Regional 
media control 
Fixed effects  Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Protest events (log)  0.198*** 0.024 0.106 0.353 
 (0.067) (0.128) (0.187) (0.304) 
News watching  0.561*** 0.366** 0.535*** 0.871*** 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.185) (0.251) 
Protest X News watching  -0.290*** -0.222*** -0.260*** -0.333*** 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.086) (0.113) 
Protested before 0.241** 0.404*** 0.349 0.964 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.355) (0.762) 
Education  -0.048 -0.025 0.084 0.176** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.060) (0.089) 
Male 0.019 -0.021 -0.025 0.101 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.083) (0.124) 
Age -0.004** -0.003** -0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Russian  0.045 0.038 -0.577 -1.583* 
 (0.220) (0.215) (0.407) (0.819) 
Urban  0.004 -0.044 -0.220* -0.140 
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.127) (0.206) 
UR voter  -0.720*** -0.692*** -0.798*** -0.610*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.081) (0.126) 
Pocketbook deteriorated  0.117*** 0.105*** 0.035 -0.013 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.069) (0.108) 
Employed  0.038 0.058 0.091 0.093 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.093) (0.134) 
Regional media control  Yes -  -  -  
Region fixed effects -  Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects  -  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.746*** 3.244*** 3.467*** 3.225** 
 (0.322) (0.466) (0.748) (1.299) 
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Observations 1,133 1,133 583 285 
R-squared 0.189 0.291 0.323 0.426 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model 1.1 is a random effects 
model. Models 1.2-3 introduce region, and survey fixed effects. To obtain balance in Models 
1.1 and 1.2 we use news watching as the treatment, and match respondents on: education, 
gender, age, ethnicity, settlement status and employment. To obtain balance in Model 2 we 
use news watching as the treatment, and match respondents on: education, gender, age, 
ethnicity, settlement status, employment, participation in protests, and pocketbook concerns. 
In Model 3, we match on the same covariates as in Model 2, plus vote cast in the 2011 Duma 
election, and evaluations of Medvedev. 
 
Table 2D10: CEM results: News watching and political attitudes  
 (1.1) (1.2) (2) (3) 
 Regional 
media  
Fixed effects  Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Protest dummy (0-1)  0.538** 0.720** 0.835 1.381 
 (0.221) (0.355) (0.521) (1.729) 
News watching  0.583*** 0.318 0.545** 0.937*** 
 (0.206) (0.207) (0.230) (0.317) 
Protest X News watching  -0.666*** -0.464** -0.602** -0.848** 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.267) (0.359) 
Protested before 0.242** 0.403*** 0.327 0.745 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.356) (0.885) 
Education  -0.046 -0.024 0.090 0.195** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.060) (0.089) 
Male 0.012 -0.032 -0.035 0.084 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.083) (0.125) 
Age -0.004** -0.003** -0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Russian  0.093 0.053 -0.538 -1.468* 
 (0.220) (0.216) (0.408) (0.817) 
Urban  -0.019 -0.049 -0.231* -0.143 
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.128) (0.207) 
UR voter  -0.717*** -0.695*** -0.797*** -0.612*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.081) (0.127) 
Pocketbook deteriorated  0.120*** 0.096** 0.036 0.009 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.069) (0.108) 
Employed  0.051 0.062 0.107 0.110 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.093) (0.135) 
Survey fixed effects -  -0.516*** -0.464*** -0.586*** 
  (0.074) (0.105) (0.154) 
Media independence  0.125***    
 (0.033)    
Region fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  
Constant 1.741*** 2.460*** 2.753*** 2.592 
 (0.347) (0.429) (0.690) (1.937) 
Observations 1,133 1,133 583 285 
R-squared 0.180 0.287 0.319 0.419 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model 1.1 is a random effects 
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model. Models 1.2-3 use region, and survey fixed effects. To obtain balance in Models 1.1 
and 1.2 we use news watching as the treatment, and match on: education, gender, age, 
ethnicity, settlement status and employment. In Model 2 we use news watching as the 
treatment, and match on: education, gender, age, ethnicity, settlement status, employment, 
participation in protests, and pocketbook concerns. In Model 3, we match on the same 
covariates as in Model 2, plus vote cast in the 2011 Duma election, and evaluations of 
Medvedev. 
 
Alternative interactions and additional visualisations  
In the manuscript, we propose that the effect of protests on support for the demands of the 
opposition is conditional on respondents’ news watching patterns. In the sections below, we 
illustrate the flip side of this interaction. More specifically, we present plots that investigate 
whether the conditional marginal effect of news watching on support for the demands of the 
protest movement changes across different levels of the protest indicator, which we now treat 
as the moderator. To begin with, Figure 2D1 compares the distribution of the moderator, in 
this case, of the protest indicator in groups of respondents who watch, and do not watch 
news. We do so in order to judge the range of common support there is in the data. The plots 




Figure 2D.1. Distribution of the moderator, protest events, in the control and treatment 
groups, i.e. among respondents who watch and do not watch political news on TV.  
 
 40 
Next, in the left-hand plot of Figure 2D.2, we plot the conventional linear marginal 
effects, with 95% CI. In the histogram across the x-axis, the total height of the stacked bars 
refers to the distribution of the protest events in the pooled sample. The red and grey shaded 
bars refer to the distribution of the moderator in the treatment and control groups 
respectively. As also made clear in Figure 2D.1, there is only a small number of respondents 
who do not watch political news on TV. The left-hand plot of Figure 2D.2 relies on region 
random effects models that control for regional media independence and use robust standard 
errors. The right-hand plot of the same figure presents results that rely on the binning 
approach. As before, we use robust standard errors. In this case, we see that the Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the linear interaction model and the three-bin model are 
statistically equivalent (p=0.04). The results are consistent when we increase the number of 










Notes: The plots in Figures 2D.2 and 2D.3 rely on models that control for regional media 
independence and use robust standard errors. The plots present the marginal effects of news 
watching (y-axis) on support for the demands of the protesters, conditional on the regional 
frequency of protest events. 95% confidence intervals shown throughout. Vertical bars 
represent the histogram of the protest variable. Coloured in red in the vertical bars are 
respondents who watch news, and in grey those who do not. Graphs produced with interflex 
(Hainmueller et al. 2018). 
 
 
Finally, in Figure 2D.4, we present marginal effects estimates from the kernel 
smoothing estimator. The kernel estimator, which is an application of the semi-parametric 
smooth varying coefficients models, relaxes the linearity assumption (see Hainmueller et al. 
2018, pp.18-20. Standard errors and confidence intervals are estimated using a bootstrap. In 
this case, the confidence intervals are generated using 2,000 iterations of a non-parametric 
bootstrap. Stacked histograms are once more presented at the bottom of the figure. The 
estimates, are a close approximation of the main effects presented earlier. Confidence 
intervals grow wider at points where the logarithmically transformed protest indicator is 
greater than the value of 3. This reflects the fact that there is less data to estimate the 






































E. Repression and support for the protesters: Robustness for Table 5 
 
Table 2E1 Robustness checks for Table 5 in the manuscript. 
 
Alternative model specifications:  
- Models 1.1 and 1.2 replicate the analysis in Models 1 and 2, Table 5 of the manuscript 
but cluster standard errors by protesting regions.  
- Models 2.1 and 2.2 omit the regional fixed effects, controlling for media 
independence  
- Models 3.1 and 3.2 replicate the analysis in Models 1 and 2, Table 5 of the manuscript 
but control for the protest indicator.  
- Models 4.1 and 4.2 replicate the analysis in Models 1 and 2, Table 5 of the manuscript 
but control for a logarithmically transformed protest indicator.  
- Models 5.1 and 5.2 interact the logarithmically transformed indicator of protests with 
the repression item.  
 
Alternative specifications of the outcome variable:  
Models 6.1 and 6.2 treat the outcome variable as ordered, and presents results based 
on ordered logistic regressions.  
Models 7.2 and 7.2 recode the outcome variable into a dummy and presents results 









Table 2E1 Robustness checks for Table 5 in the manuscript. 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The analysis also controls for education, gender, age, ethnicity, 
pocketbook conditions, partisanship, prior protest participation and employment status. Source: 2012 January survey, 2012 RES survey and 
author protest-event dataset. 
           OLogit Probit  
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2) (5.1) (5.2) (6.1) (6.2) (7.1) (7.2) 
Repression  -0.80*** -0.80*** 0.11 0.13 -0.75*** -0.58*** -0.37** -0.50*** -0.26 -0.63*** -0.84** -1.13*** -0.65** -0.88*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.36) (0.38) (0.29) (0.29) 
Protest     -0.02*** -0.06***         
     (0.00) (0.01)         
Protest (log)        -0.39*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.89*** -0.64*** -0.66*** -0.43*** 
       (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.10) 
Re X Protest          -0.15* 0.12     
         (0.09) (0.12)     
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region FE  ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Media control    0.05 0.07           
   (0.06) (0.06)           
Constant 3.35*** 1.64*** 2.23*** 1.90*** 4.03*** 1.68*** 4.28*** 1.66*** 4.41*** 3.09*** -5.80*** -3.27*** 3.29*** 1.18** 
 (0.33) (0.23) (0.35) (0.31) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.58) (0.56) (0.46) (0.49) 
               
Observations 1,648 1,379 1,648 1,379 1,648 1,379 1,648 1,379 1,648 1,379 1,648 1,379 1,641 1,372 
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Additional hypotheses  
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2E2 investigate whether impact of police repression on 
attitudes is conditioned by political orientations, or support for the ruling regime. They do so 
by interacting the suppression and vote indicators. Model 1 uses the full sample of 
respondents, while Model 2 drops Moscow and St Petersburg from the analysis. In both sets 
of models, the effect of suppression is negative, and statistically significant. The interaction 
terms, while failing to reach statistical levels of significance are also negatively signed. 
Consider Model 1 for example. Holding all other covariates in their empirical means, we see 
that for respondents who did not vote for United Russia, support for the demands of the 
opposition was around 3 points in areas with peaceful protests (95%CI: 2.9, 3.15) and just 
around 2.3 in areas with at least one violently suppressed protest event (95% CI: 2.1, 2.5). 
For United Russia voters, support for the demands of the protesters is around 2.4 (95% CI: 
2.2, 2.5) in regions with peaceful protests, and just around 1.5 (95% CI: 1.3, 1.7) in areas 



















Table 2E2: Repression effects conditional on political orientations – Dependent variable: 
support for the demands of the protesters. 
  
 (1) (2) 
 (OLS) (OLS) 
Repression  -0.74*** -0.75*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
UR voter  -0.65*** -0.64*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Repression X UR voter -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.09) (0.11) 
Protested past  0.27*** 0.17* 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Education 0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Male  0.03 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian  0.04 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Urban  0.05 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Watches news  -0.11 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.10) 
Pocketbook worse 0.15*** 0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Employed  0.05 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Region fixed effects  ✓ ✓ 
Moscow & SP  ✓ -  
Constant 3.32*** 3.00*** 
 (0.24) (0.25) 
   
Observations 1,648 1,379 
R-squared 0.26 0.28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 












S.I. 3: Additional Results 
 
A: Alternative outcome variables  
Drawing on evidence from the January 2012 survey, Table 3A1 shows that unfolding protests 
increased awareness of fraud in the 2011 Duma election (Models 1 and 2) and dampened the 
likelihood that survey respondents would report to know ‘little, or almost nothing about the 
national protest movement (Models 3 and 4). Model 5 shows that perceptions of electoral 
fraud are also lower among respondents who report not to be aware of the protest events.
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The ‘fraud’ indicator is measured on a continuous, 5-point scale, with higher values denoting 
greater awareness of fraud. The protest awareness indicator is a binary variable coded as 1 if 
respondents report to know little, or almost nothing about the demands of the protesters and 
zero if otherwise.  
 
Table 3A1: Evaluations of fraud and awareness of the protests  
 Fraud evaluations (OLS)  Not aware  
of the protests (Logit)  
Fraud 
evaluations 














Protest item  0.02*** 0.10*** -0.04*** -0.10**  
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05)  
Unaware of protests     -0.23*** 
     (0.06) 
Media independence -0.13*** -0.12*** 0.15*** 0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant 2.77*** 2.74*** -0.39 -0.40 3.42*** 
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.40) (0.40) (0.28) 
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,138 1,138 1,463 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 2012 
January survey and protest-event dataset. Models also control for respondents’ age, gender, 
education, ethnicity, settlement status, employment status, evaluations of pocketbook 
conditions, vote cast, news watching and prior protest participation.  
 
To assess the effect of protests on awareness of fraud across the protest wave, Table 3A2 
draws on evidence from the January and spring surveys. The protest item in Models 1 and 3 
ranges from one to the maximum number of events. The protest item in Models 2 and 4 
considers respondents in areas with and without protests, i.e. it ranges from 0 to the 
maximum number of events. Models 3 and 4 drop Moscow and St Petersburg from the 
                                                     
8
 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
 48 
sample. This results in the loss of 335 observations. The protest coefficient in Models 1 and 2 
suggests that across the country, unfolding protests increased awareness of fraud. Yet, the 
protest item loses its significance in Models 3 and 4. The sign of the protest coefficient flips 
in Model 4. The negatively signed survey fixed effects suggest that - just like support for the 
protesters- awareness of fraud was higher in the winter, as opposed to the spring months.  
 
Table 3A2: Protests and awareness of fraud (OLS models): Evidence from the protest 
wave   









Protest item  0.01** 0.01* 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Watches news  -0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Protested past 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Education 0.07** 0.06* 0.08** 0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Male 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian 0.18** 0.14* 0.19** 0.15* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Urban 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
UR voter -0.83*** -0.81*** -0.80*** -0.78*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Pocketbook worse  0.25*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Employed  0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Survey fixed effects  -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.41*** -0.20* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
Region fixed effects  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant 2.37*** 2.48*** 2.41*** 2.64*** 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.35) (0.31) 
Observations 2,518 3,047 2,183 2,712 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: 2012 






B: Did more democratic regions protest more? And, did they suppress protesters less?  
 
To probe whether (i) there is a tendency for anti-regime protest events to occur in regions that 
traditionally feature a wider pool of activists and pro-democratic attitudes amongst the 
population, and (ii) the relationship between suppression and regional democracy, we 
perform tests employing regional democracy indices covering the years 2006-2010. The 
indices were devised by experts on Russian political geographers Nikolay Petrov and Alexei 
Titkov and are widely employed in studies of Russian regional politics.
9
 The media 
independence, political pluralism and democracy of elections variables are measured on a 1-5 
scale, with higher values denoting more democratic regions. The ‘aggregate democracy’ 
indicator is measured on a 1-50 scale instead. In the period under consideration, the mean 
value of this indicator is 30, and the maximum is 43. The protest variables used for this part 
of the analysis describe the total number of relevant protest events that took place across 
Russia’s 83 regions from December 4
th
, 2011 to May 31
st
, 2012. The repression variable used 
for this part of the analysis is a binary indicator coded as one for regions with violent protests 
and zero otherwise. Both indicators come from the protest-event dataset assembled for this 
work.  
As illustrated in Column 1, Table 3B1, the correlation between regional democratic 
indicators, measured with the use of several proxies from the Petrov and Titkov Index and the 
protest item is well below the .5 threshold. Column 2 in Table 3B1 considers the correlation 
between regional democracy scores and repression. Once more, the relationship between the 
variables appears weak. Moreover, with the exception of the media independence variable, 
the bivariate correlations reported in both columns fail to reach statistical levels of 
significance.  
 
Table 3B1: Bivariate correlation between regional democratic indicators, (i) the regional 
protests taking place between December 2011 and May 2012 (Column 1), and (ii) the 
use of repression against protesters (Column 2)  
 (1) (2) 
 Protest frequency 
(n=83 regions)  
Repression used against 
protesters 
(n=83 regions) 
Media Independence .31 (.00)     .20 (.08) 
Political Pluralism  .10 (.36) .09 (.44) 
Democracy of Elections  -.07 (.52) -.09 (.44) 
Average Democracy Score  18. (.10) .14 (.18) 
                                                     
9
 Information on the composition of the indices is provided in Section 1C of this Appendix. 
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Next, we turn to explore whether regional democracy indicators predict the number of 
political protest events that took place across Russia’s 83 regions between December 2011 
and May 2012. The dependent variable in this set of models ranges from zero protest events 
to 105. We summarize findings from four different models in the left-hand panel of figure 
3B1. This plots coefficients from OLS models with robust standard errors, but the 
coefficients on the variables of interest do not change if we use negative binomial regressions 
instead. Russia’s 83 regions are the unit of analysis. In the left-hand panel of Figure 1, the 
aggregate democracy indicator emerges as a statistically significant predictor of the 
frequency of protest events at the 1% level. A unit increase in the democracy index for 
example, predicts an increase of protest frequency by less than .38 (SE .12). The media 
independence indicator reaches statistical levels of significance at the 5% level. Results 
suggest that a unit- increase in regional media independence, is associated with 
approximately four additional protest events. The coefficient on the indicator designed to 
capture how democratic regional elections have been in the past is negative, and fails to reach 
statistical levels of significance. When we replicate the analysis restricting the sample to 
those regions that experienced some form of unrest during this period, i.e. to regions with at 
least one single protest event, the correlation between regional democracy indicators and 
protest frequency appears weaker. Of all the indicators considered, only the regional media 
indicator reaches statistical levels of significance at the 1 percent level. This suggests that 
regional democracy indicators poorly predicted the frequency of regional protests taking 
place across Russia’s protesting regions this period. 
The right-hand panel of Figure 3B1 considers the correlation between the same 
indicators of regional democracy and the use of repression against protesters. Here, the 
dependent variable is a dummy, coded as one if repression was used against protesters and 
zero if not. Reported coefficients rely on four sets of probit models, with robust standard 
errors. Once more, we observe a weak relationship between regional democratic indicators 
and the use of repression against protesters. Results reported here do not change when we 
restrict the sample to those regions that experienced some form of unrest during this period, 
i.e. to regions with at least one single protest event. In all models we run with the reduced 




Figure 3B1: Regional democracy indicators, protests events and repression 
Notes: The dependent variable in the left-hand panel of Figure 3B1 is a continuous indicator 
of protest-event frequency. It captures the number of relevant political protests taking place 
in Russia’s 83 regions between December 2011 and May 2012. The dependent variable in the 
right-hand panel of Figure 3B1 is a binary indicator coded as 1 if repression was used against 
protesters in any given region during any of the protest events and zero if otherwise. The unit 
of analysis are Russia’s 83 regions. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals. Data come 












C: Protest effects conditional on reported vote in the 2011 Duma election.  
 
We are conscious of the fact that the effect of protests on public opinion may also 
depend on bystanders’ political affiliations, or partisanship. In analysing perceptions of 
election fraud during the 2012 elections in Russia, for example, Graeme Robertson (2017) 
finds a significant effect of partisanship and prior association with support for the opposition 
in influencing the extent to which voters perceive electoral fraud as a problem. Studies of 
media effects on public opinion likewise highlight the significance of attitudinal priors in 
mediating information effects on public opinion. While some studies have found that 
exposure to politically-polarized messages has a greater effect on those with political priors 
different from those conveyed through a media information channel, others indicate that 
greater receptivity to political messaging is found among citizens already ideologically 
predisposed towards a particular message (discussed in Peisakhin and Rosenas 2018). In a 
recent analysis of Russian media’s biased news broadcasting in Ukraine during the 2014 
electoral cycle, for example, Peisakhin and Rosenas find that Russia’s propaganda in support 
of pro-Russian political parties and candidates was most effective among those with already 
strong pro-Russian priors, while its effects on those with strong pro-Western priors were 
ineffective or even counter-productive.  
As existing research highlights, however, “unexpected circumstances” and “anxiety” 
may well generate a learning effect, influencing the receptivity of those even with with pro-
regime political orientations to messages critical of the regime (see for example: Robertson 
2017, p.606). The 2012 electoral protests we examine here, unprecedented in scale as they 
had been, may well have generated an effect of updating of extant distribution of political 
preferences, with both anti, and pro-regime supporters updating their support for the demands 
of the opposition.  
As an extension of our baseline hypothesis that protests influence public opinion, 
therefore, the analysis we present below also helps establish whether the effects of protests 
are conditional on political orientation, or support for the ruling regime. We need, however, 
to acknowledge upfront that reported vote does not fully, or necessarily operationalize the 
concept of regime support, as a stable identity. Stated vote as a proxy for partisanship also 




To examine the hypothesis that partisanship moderates the effect of protests with the 
data we have available, we interact the protest indicator with the reported indicator of vote 
cast in the December 2011 Parliamentary election. This election occurred prior to the onset of 
the 2011-12 electoral protest wave. The analysis presented below draws on evidence from the 
protest wave, i.e. the combination of the two surveys that were in the field in January 2012, 
as well as later in the spring. Models presented in Table 3C1 below introduce region and 
survey fixed effects. The protest indicators consider the full sample of respondents, that is, 
those interviewed before and after any protest events took place in their region. In Models 1.1 
and 1.2 the protest indicator is logarithmically transformed.  Models 1.2 and 2.2 drop 
respondents in Moscow and St Petersburg from the sample. This results in the loss of 
approximately 270 observations, roughly 15 percent of the entire sample. As noted in the 
manuscript, the vote indicator is a binary variable which takes the value of one if the 
respondent indicates that she voted for the United Russia party in December 2011 and zero 
otherwise.  
In all four sets of models, the protest indicators are negatively signed. This is 
consistent with evidence already presented in Table 3 of the manuscript. The interaction 
terms between vote cast and protest events are also negatively signed. Yet, the interaction 
terms are only significant at the 5 % level in Models 1.1 and 2.1, which consider the full 
sample of respondents. While the interaction terms are also negatively signed in Models 2.1 
and 2.2, we are now working with a smaller sample, and the confidence intervals are 
inevitably larger.  
Model 2.1, for example, suggests that holding all other covariates at their empirical 
mean, as protest events increase from zero to the regional average of 7 events, support for the 
demands of the protesters drops by approximately .07 points among UR supporters (95% CI: 
-.10, -.04). By contrast, a similar increase in protest activity does not shift support for the 
protest movement among respondents who either did not vote for United Russia, or who 
abstained in the December 2011 election. As protests increase from 0 to the regional average 
of 7 events, support for the protesters among this group of respondents, which already is very 
high at around 2.7, shifts by -.03 (95% CI: -.07, .00). This change in support for the protesters 











Table 3C1: Protest effects conditional on partisanship: Evidence from the protest wave  
 (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
 Full sample 
(OLS) 
Drops M& 




StP (OLS)  
Protest log (0-max) -0.13 -0.05   
 (0.09) (0.10)   
Protest non-log (0-max)   -0.00* -0.00 
   (0.00) (0.02) 
UR voter  -0.58*** -0.62*** -0.65*** -0.64*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) 
Protest X UR voter -0.07* -0.03 -0.01*** -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) 
Watches news  0.02 0.15 0.03 0.15 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Protested past  0.33*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.24*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Education 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Male 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Russian 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Urban 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Pocketbook worse 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employed  0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Survey fixed effects  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region fixed effects  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant 3.30*** 2.83*** 3.08*** 2.78*** 
 (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) 
Observations 1,980 1,711 1,980 1,711 
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 
January 2012 Stephen White survey and April-May 2012 Russian Election Study.  
 
 
We are finally conscious of the possibility that after the protests erupted, respondents could 
have misreported how they voted in the Parliamentary election, even if voting occurred prior 
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to protests. To deal with this issue, we perform the following checks. First, we examine 
whether in our sample, electoral protests predict reported vote choice in the 2011 Duma 
election. We present results from probit models in Models 1-4 in Table 3C2. The protest 
items in Models 1 and 3 consider respondents in regions with and without protests, while the 
protest items in Models 2 and 4 consider whether in regions with protests, support for the 
ruling party increases as a function of local unrest. The protest coefficients fail to reach 
statistical levels of significance in all four models. Findings echo research by Frye and 
Borisova (2016, p.29) who show that respondents interviewed after the 2011 Duma election 
and after the onset of the 2011 electoral protests were just as likely to report supporting 
United Russia and other parties as before the election and before the protests. In other words, 
we have no evidence that in response to the 2011-12 protests Russians over, or under-
reported their opposition to the regime.  
Second, we leverage evidence from the panel component of the 2008 and 2012 Russian 
Election Surveys to show that political orientations moderate responses to protests, even 
when we consider items from the 2008 RES survey. Items of reported partisanship in the 
2008 RES survey are unlikely to suffer from any social desirability bias related to the 
outbreak of protests after the 2011 Duma election. We report these results below.   
 
 
Table 3C2: Protests do not predict reported vote in the 2011 election.  
 Full sample Without M&SP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 0-max 
 
1-max 0-max 1-max 
Protest item  0.01 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Protested before  -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region fixed effects  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Survey fixed effects  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant -0.22 0.14 -0.12 0.12 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.33) (0.33) 
Observations 3,047 2,518 2,712 2,183 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models control for 
respondents’ education, gender, age, ethnicity, settlement status, news watching and 
pocketbook concerns.  
 
Evidence from the panel component of the Russian Election Study (RES) surveys of 
2008 and 2012 respectively  
 
Results presented in Table 3C3 below rely on the panel component of the Russian 
Election Study surveys. The sample consists of those respondents who were first interviewed 
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as part of the 2008 Russian Election Study survey, and then successfully re-interviewed 
during the 2012 Russian Election Study survey. A total of 666 respondents were successfully 
interviewed in the two surveys.  Just like in the manuscript, the dependent variable is a 4-
point indicator, with higher values denoting greater support for the demands of the protesters. 
‘UR voters’ are respondents who in the 2008 survey reported to vote for the ruling regime 
party, United Russia, in the December 2007 Parliamentary election. The analysis controls for 
the full set of controls introduced in the main part of the manuscript and drops Moscow and 
St Petersburg from the sample. Models 1-4 consider four different iterations of the protest 
item: in Model 1, the protest item is a continuous indicator of protest events, ranging from 0 
to the maximum number of regional protests. We logarithmically transform this indicator in 
Model 2. In Model 3, the protest variable is a continuous indicator that only considers 
respondents in areas with protest events alone, that is one that ranges from 1 to the maximum 
number of events. We logarithmically transform this indicator in Model 4. The interaction 
term between the protest and the vote cast items is negatively signed in all models.  
Consistent with the analysis of the cross-sectional data, we see that for respondents 
who supported the ruling regime party in the past, protests do not increase support for the 
demands of the protesters. Consider Model 1 for example. Results suggests that as the 
number of protests increases from 0 to the regional average of 4, support for the protesters 
among non-UR supporters increases by .20 points (90% CI: .04, .33), moving from 2.1 to 
approximately 2.3 respectively. This is well above the mean of the protest support variable, 
which is measured on a 4-point scale. Among UR supporters, support for the protesters drops 
by .02 instead (90%CI: -.16, .12), and this change fails to reach statistical levels of 
significance. Similar results are obtained in Model 3, which restricts the sample to 
respondents in places with protests alone. Evidence suggests that as the number of protests 
increases from the minimum of 1 to the average of 5, support for the protesters among non-
UR supporters increases by .28 (90% CI: .11, .45), moving from 2 to 2.3 points respectively.  
This change in support for the protesters is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
Once more, changes in the frequency of protests fail to increase support for the demands of 


















Table 3C3: Heterogeneous effects of protests based on political orientations (OLS models) - 
Evidence from the panel component of the 2008-2012 surveys 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Protest 
(0-max) 
Log item Protest 
(1-max) 
Log item 
Protest item  0.05** 0.11 0.07** 0.30** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12) 
UR voter (2008)  -0.10 -0.11 0.03 0.08 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) (0.26) 
UR voter X Protest  -0.05* -0.14 -0.06 -0.24 
 (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.17) 
Pocketbook worse  0.08 0.07 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Watches news  0.19 0.16 0.04 0.02 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.27) (0.27) 
Protested past  0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Urban 0.15* 0.16* 0.26** 0.27*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Russian -0.31** -0.32** -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
Education  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Employed -0.20* -0.21* -0.32** -0.32** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
Male -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Media independence  0.02 0.04 0.07 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
     
Constant 2.06*** 2.11*** 1.39*** 1.33** 
 (0.44) (0.46) (0.53) (0.54) 
     
Respondents  407 407 325 325 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 2008-2012 
panel sample of the 2008-2012 Russian Election Study survey. The models drop Moscow and 
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